mediumpull_requests
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediummarket_data
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumpull_requests
Tool accepts raw payment/authorization credentials as plaintext parameters
The schema asks the calling agent to pass 'buyer_key', an x402 'payment' payload, an MPP 'credential' (explicitly described as 'the base64url JSON that would follow "Authorization: Payment"'), and an AP2 'mandate' directly as tool arguments. Routing authorization/payment tokens through the LLM's context and MCP transport as ordinary string fields increases the risk of these secrets being logged, echoed back into conversation, or otherwise leaked, compared to a proper out-of-band auth channel.
mediumrequest_agent_contact
'sell_identity' consent scope permits sharing consumer PII with marketing partners
Beyond the core function of connecting a consumer to licensed agents, the tool exposes a broader consent scope ('sell_identity') that 'additionally permits sharing with marketing partners.' Because scope defaults to 'contact_consumer' but can be silently upgraded via the consent object, there is risk that an agent could present ambiguous or insufficiently clear consent language (or accept a human's vague affirmative) and inadvertently authorize sale of the consumer's name/phone/email to third-party marketers rather than just licensed agents.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowregister_agency
Collects licensing/business PII with email-based confirmation but no other issues found
This tool requests business and personal contact details (NPN, contact name/email/phone) for legitimate agency onboarding and requires email confirmation before any lead delivery. No manipulative instructions or excessive scope were found; flagged only for awareness that phone/email verification tokens are handled similarly to the request_agent_contact flow and should be validated server-side, not just trusted from agent input.