mcp.hiveintelligence.xyz

This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.

The schema uses additionalProperties: {} at the top level (in addition to the 'args' object also being unconstrained), so the tool will pass through essentially any key/value pairs to whatever endpoint name is supplied. Combined with the fact that the set of valid 'endpoint_name' values is not enumerated in this schema (it's discovered dynamically via search_tools/get_api_endpoint_schema), this creates a broad, loosely-typed invocation surface. This is a reasonable design for a tool gateway, but it does mean the agent is trusting run-time discovery to constrain behavior rather than a fixed, auditable schema — worth confirming server-side that only a real read-only allowlist is reachable through this router.

Like invoke_api_endpoint, this router has additionalProperties: {} and accepts an open-ended 'args' object plus flat top-level keys for any named endpoint. The description does correctly instruct that state-changing calls require explicit user approval and must not be auto-approved, which is a good safeguard, but the enforcement of that approval and of which endpoints are legitimately state-changing depends entirely on server-side logic not visible in this schema. Flagging for visibility only — no evidence of malicious intent, but the breadth of 'create, update, archive, remember, forget, acknowledge, or resolve durable state' via a single generic router is a large capability surface relative to the narrow, well-scoped read tools elsewhere in this set.