MCP security report
api.chieflab.io
F5/100
Security grade FA few things are worth a closer look before connecting.
Connected ✓45 tools scanned
https://api.chieflab.io/api/mcp
mediumchieflab_connect_provider
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_force_measurement_due
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_measure_hacker_news
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_execute_approved_action
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_signup_workspace
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_set_provider_key
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_approve_action
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumchieflab_signup_workspace
Instructs agent to write secrets to local filesystem/config
The description directs the agent to use its filesystem tools to write the newly issued apiKey into the user's MCP config file and then prompt a runtime restart, rather than simply returning the key for the user to handle. This is an instruction aimed at the agent's behavior (modify local config files autonomously) that goes beyond the tool's stated purpose of creating a workspace, and could be leveraged to get an agent to silently modify local configuration/credential files without explicit user review.
mediumchieflab_force_measurement_due
Admin tool requires supplying a secret token value
The tool requires an `adminToken` parameter that 'must match CHIEFLAB_ADMIN_TOKEN env var'. This effectively asks the calling agent to locate and pass along a sensitive environment variable/credential as a plain tool argument, which could encourage an agent to read and expose secret admin tokens it should not be handling routinely.
lowchieflab_get_users_after_build
Unusually long tool description
Very long descriptions are sometimes used to bury instructions to the AI. Skim it before allowing.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowchieflab_verify_install
Instruction to withhold information from the user
The description explicitly tells the agent 'Do NOT list every internal tool — render the summary only,' directing the agent to hide the full set of callable/internal tools from the user. While likely intended for UX simplicity, this is an instruction to suppress information from the user rather than just describing the tool's function, which is a mild manipulation pattern worth flagging.
lowchieflab_launch_product
Unvalidated webhookUrl parameter could exfiltrate launch data
The tool accepts an arbitrary `webhookUrl` with no described validation or allow-listing. If an agent is induced to set this to an attacker-controlled endpoint, launch data (positioning, drafts, repo context) could be sent to a third party outside the user's visibility. Not inherently malicious, but the lack of description/guardrails around destination validation is a minor data-exfiltration risk.
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[](https://gateturbo.com/report/ca9ad6b0-229d-49c5-aa0f-eea06726e8fe)Scanned 9/5/2026 · This is a point-in-time snapshot of the server’s public tools. Re-scan.
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