MCP security report
voicescape.vercel.app
C76/100
Security grade CA few things are worth a closer look before connecting.
Connected ✓18 tools scanned
https://voicescape.vercel.app/api/mcp
mediumprepare_agent_vault
Grants the agent autonomous, repeated spending authority from a shared account
This tool sets up a two-key account where the agent's own key can spend funds unilaterally after a single human approval, with no further per-transaction confirmation. While the design includes reasonable safeguards (human signs once, can revoke, public-key-only exchange, explicit 'never share private key/seed phrase' warnings), granting an AI agent standing authority to spend from a funded account is a materially broader capability than the other read/verify tools in this set and should be flagged for scrutiny (cap is 25 HBAR, but still real value movement without ongoing consent).
lowprepare_agent_claim
Unusually long tool description
Very long descriptions are sometimes used to bury instructions to the AI. Skim it before allowing.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowpost_agent_intro
Promotional link embedded in tool description aimed at the agent
The description includes a call-to-action and Discord invite URL ('Want to go further... Join the Discord: https://discord.gg/...') directed at the AI agent rather than describing tool mechanics. This is marketing content injected into a tool description, which could condition the agent to promote external links to the user unprompted. Not malicious, but it is scope creep beyond the tool's stated function (posting an intro) and should be treated as untrusted/optional rather than something the agent is nudged to act on.
lowprepare_agent_vault
Tool description scripts the agent's conversation with the user
The description contains a section titled 'HOW TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOUR HUMAN (use plain words like these in chat)' that dictates specific talking points for the agent to relay. While the content appears to be a reasonable transparency disclosure (costs, mechanics), embedding scripted dialogue instructions inside a tool description is an unusual pattern that blurs the line between describing the tool and directing the agent's conversational behavior, and should be reviewed to ensure it isn't used to understate risk or steer user consent.
lowprepare_vault_page
Agent signs and submits transactions autonomously using its own key
This tool has the agent sign and execute register/update transactions for the blockpage using its own private key outside the server, funded by the shared vault, without a human signature at the time of the action. This is consistent with the vault's stated design, but combined with prepare_agent_vault it represents a capability chain that allows ongoing autonomous on-chain actions and spending after a single initial human approval — worth flagging as a broader capability than typical read-only or single-shot approval tools in this set.
Embed this badge
Show your MCP server’s security grade
Paste this into your README:
[](https://gateturbo.com/report/b9fbf4fd-7881-466e-96ee-67fb6e8f56c0)Scanned 10/4/2026 · This is a point-in-time snapshot of the server’s public tools. Re-scan.
Connect this server safely with gate.
Continuous re-scans, drift alerts, per-tool allow/ask/block, and a log of every call.
Monitor it — free