MCP security report
californiacarquotes.com
D58/100
Security grade DA few things are worth a closer look before connecting.
Connected ✓8 tools scanned
https://californiacarquotes.com/mcp
mediumpull_requests
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediummarket_data
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumrequest_agent_contact
Built-in 'sell_identity' scope shares consumer PII with marketing partners
The consent object supports a scope value 'sell_identity' that 'additionally permits sharing with marketing partners' beyond the up-to-4 licensed agents. While gated by consent, this is a broad data-monetization capability embedded in what is framed as a simple 'connect consumer with agents' tool. An agent operator or user skimming the tool's stated purpose (get quotes from licensed agents) may not expect their identity/contact info could be sold to unspecified marketing partners. The consent text and scope selection are attacker/operator controlled, so a poorly presented consent flow could result in data being sold without the user clearly understanding the difference between 'contact_consumer' and 'sell_identity'.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowrequest_agent_contact
Dynamic pricing/priority tied to phone verification
The description states 'A verified number sells at the verified price and is contacted first,' indicating the consumer's contact record is priced and sold, with verification affecting sale price and priority. This monetization detail is disclosed but reinforces that consumer contact data is being sold as a commodity, which should be transparent to the end user, not just the calling agent.
lowpull_requests
Accepts raw payment/credential/mandate strings as tool arguments
The tool takes buyer_key, payment (x402 payload), credential (base64url JSON Authorization payload), and mandate (AP2 Payment Mandate) as plain string parameters. If an agent is not careful about where these values come from, there's risk of an agent being induced to paste stored payment credentials or mandates into this call inappropriately. This is a normal pattern for x402-style metered APIs, but the broad acceptance of multiple credential formats in one tool increases the risk surface for credential mishandling by the calling agent.
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[](https://gateturbo.com/report/939a606b-0660-4c7d-8cab-8dc250cb4b1a)Scanned 9/7/2026 · This is a point-in-time snapshot of the server’s public tools. Re-scan.
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