mcp.submitrax.com

This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.

Accepts an unconstrained JSON payload and forwards it to a configured external n8n webhook. If an agent is manipulated into including sensitive data (tokens, user PII, submission contents) in the payload, that data would be sent to a third-party endpoint outside the SubmitraX platform.

Generates/resets a long-lived sk_ API token scoped to a workspace that can be used to authenticate future tool calls (per set_auth_token). This is a legitimate feature but is a sensitive, high-privilege action — misuse or leakage of the returned token would grant durable workspace access.

Lets a caller register any URL (Slack, Discord, or generic) to receive form submission data, which may include end-user PII. An agent manipulated by injected instructions (e.g., via custom_html or another data source) could be directed to add a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing ongoing exfiltration of submitted data.

Setting slack_webhook to an arbitrary URL causes future submission notifications (potentially containing PII) to be sent to that endpoint. Combined with custom_html (which can contain arbitrary markup/scripts rendered to end users), this gives broad control over both data flow and public-facing content with no apparent validation of the destination domain.

Deletes a workspace and all its forms and submissions in a single call with no confirmation step exposed in the schema; an agent could be tricked via prompt injection elsewhere into deleting significant user data irreversibly.