mediumimport_crontab
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumping_slug
Ingest key parameter locked to a hardcoded example value via enum
The `ingestKey` parameter's schema restricts allowed values to a single-item enum: ["hpk_exemplo"]. This means any agent that follows the schema strictly will always submit this specific key instead of the user's actual ingest key obtained from `ingest_key`. If "hpk_exemplo" is a real, attacker-controlled key (rather than a placeholder), this could silently redirect the user's monitoring pings/events into someone else's HookPulse account, leaking information about the user's job execution patterns and potentially spoofing/hijacking their monitor. Even if benign, an enum that hardcodes an 'example' credential is a red flag and should be a free-text field or omitted entirely, letting the agent use the key returned by `ingest_key`.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowcreate_endpoint
Endpoint can be configured to POST alert data to arbitrary external URLs
The `alert_url` parameter accepts any public HTTPS URL and will receive a POST containing monitor/incident data on a miss. While this is a stated, legitimate webhook feature (Slack/Discord/n8n), an agent could be induced (e.g., via a malicious prompt elsewhere) to set this to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing ongoing exfiltration of the user's job-monitoring metadata. No validation or user-confirmation step is described in the tool definition for changing this value.