mediumregister_agent
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumcheck_registration
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumcancel_registration
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumrevoke_self
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumyo
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowcheck_registration
Instruction to agent about secret storage
The description tells the AI to 'store it immediately in your secret mechanism' and 'MUST show the user' the paired_with account. This is a reasonable operational instruction for a pairing flow, but it's worth noting this is an embedded directive to the agent rather than pure data; verify it doesn't get used to suppress showing paired_with in some flows or to store the key in an insecure location. Overall benign but should be monitored since it directs agent behavior beyond simple data return.
lowyo
Notification with tap-through URL could enable redirection
The context_url parameter allows the tool to specify an https or app deep-link URL that opens when the user taps the notification. While described as content-free, this could be used to direct users to arbitrary URLs (phishing risk) if the calling agent is compromised or manipulated. Not a prompt-injection risk per se, but a capability that should be validated/sanitized (e.g., domain allowlisting) given it's user-facing and could be abused for phishing if the agent's inputs are attacker-influenced.