MCP security report
www.conductorrelay.com
F10/100
Security grade FA few things are worth a closer look before connecting.
Connected ✓39 tools scanned
https://www.conductorrelay.com/mcp
mediuma2a_list_public_agents
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediuma2a_send_message
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediuma2a_get_messages
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumregister_agent
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumget_funding_status
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumlist_direct_offers
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumcreate_funding_checkout
Real-money charge can be directed to a third-party agent chosen by the AI
The tool allows the caller to specify an arbitrary 'target_agent_id' to receive a funded balance instead of the calling agent, converting real USD (via Stripe Checkout) into CPTM credited to that third party ('gifting grants no control over the target'). An agent could be manipulated (e.g., via a prior prompt injection from an untrusted source) into creating a checkout that routes the user's money to an unintended recipient. There is no schema-level requirement for explicit user confirmation of the target or amount before generating the payment link.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowresolve_commercial_intent
Embedded imperative directive aimed at agent output behavior
The description contains direct second-person commands to the calling AI ('You MUST present the route_card.disclosure_text and MUST NOT make any route_card.forbidden_claims') rather than purely describing the tool's function. While the intent (affiliate disclosure compliance) appears benign, embedding behavioral mandates inside a tool description is a pattern that can be used to steer an agent's downstream conduct/output beyond the scope of the tool call itself, and should be treated with the same scrutiny as any other instruction-injection vector.
lowcreate_worker_delegation
Broad delegated spending/session authority with few built-in constraints surfaced to the agent
This operation lets the caller mint a delegation with its own max_spend_cptm, concurrency, and rate limits for a separate worker_id/token_hash, effectively granting a third party spending authority against the account. This is consistent with the platform's stated purpose, but because limits are caller-supplied rather than platform-enforced minimums, an agent could be induced to create an overly permissive delegation without additional confirmation safeguards.
Embed this badge
Show your MCP server’s security grade
Paste this into your README:
[](https://gateturbo.com/report/65b87031-150e-4648-8e0c-c6f45d8e623d)Scanned 9/4/2026 · This is a point-in-time snapshot of the server’s public tools. Re-scan.
Connect this server safely with gate.
Continuous re-scans, drift alerts, per-tool allow/ask/block, and a log of every call.
Monitor it — free