MCP security report
mcp-production-ff29.up.railway.app
D58/100
Security grade DA few things are worth a closer look before connecting.
Connected ✓35 tools scanned
https://mcp-production-ff29.up.railway.app/mcp
mediumme_discover
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumme_resolve
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
mediumme_purchase_execute
Handles payment authorization tokens with broad request forwarding
This tool accepts an 'authorization' credential and a freeform 'request' object and dispatches a paid transaction. There is no schema constraint on what 'request' can contain, which could allow arbitrary or unintended payment actions if populated with unexpected fields. Agents should ensure the request object is tightly scoped to the previously quoted transaction before dispatching payment.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowme_escalate
Broad blocker escalation capability with spend authority
Accepts max_spend_cents and required/forbidden actions with an objective and blocker description, effectively allowing an agent to trigger spending and intervention workflows on behalf of an organization. While this appears to be the tool's intended purpose, the combination of financial commitment (max_spend_cents) and broad free-text 'objective'/'blocker_description' fields warrants confirming that a human or policy layer reviews high-value escalations before execution.
lowme_get_spending_mandate
Exposes spending mandate details
Retrieves persistent spending mandate governing an organization or agent. This is sensitive financial/authorization metadata; ensure access is properly scoped to the authenticated caller only, since the 'agent_key' parameter is a free-text string that could potentially be used to query mandates for other agents if not server-side validated.
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[](https://gateturbo.com/report/346a8cd3-4c95-455c-8008-5677a2422458)Scanned 9/9/2026 · This is a point-in-time snapshot of the server’s public tools. Re-scan.
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