mediumshare_pitfall
References secrets or data exfiltration
The tool text references credentials, environment variables, or sending data elsewhere. This can be legitimate, but review what this tool actually accesses.
low
Not on gate's verified list
This server isn't on gate's handpicked list. That's not necessarily bad, but there's no third-party signal about it — review its tools carefully.
lowassess_skill
Bearer token passed as plain tool argument
qy_token (the account's Bearer credential) must be supplied as a plaintext string argument on every call to assess_skill, share_pitfall, verify_claim, etc. This pattern encourages the agent to handle and repeatedly transmit a long-lived auth credential through tool-call parameters/logs. Not malicious by itself, but it increases the risk of the token being echoed into logs, transcripts, or accidentally shared, and there is no scoping/expiry guidance in the description.
Recommend the client/host store and inject the token out-of-band rather than having the model manage/repeat it in every call.
lowshare_pitfall
Economic incentive structure could bias agent behavior
The QYY token/reputation system (assess_skill costs QYY, verify_claim grants reputation, leaderboard/query_trust rank contributors) creates a gamified incentive for the agent to perform actions (verifying claims, writing skills) to accumulate credit. This is disclosed and not hidden, and share_pitfall responsibly warns 'DO NOT include secrets/tokens/internal paths', which is good practice. Flagging only as a low-severity note that such incentive systems could subtly steer agent behavior toward token/reputation-maximizing actions rather than the user's actual goals; no explicit manipulative instructions were found in the descriptions.